Alvarado, C. S. (2000). Out-of-body experiences. In E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Éd.), Varieties of Anomalous Experiences: Examining the Scientific Evidence (p. 183‑218). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Apps, M. A. J., & Tsakiris, M. (2014). The free-energy self: a predictive coding account of self-recognition. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 41, 85‑97.

Ataria, Y., Dor-Ziderman, Y., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2015). How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator. Consciousness and Cognition, 37, 133‑147.

Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13(8), 556‑571.

Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 7‑13.

Blanke, O., Slater, M., & Serino, A. (2015). Behavioral, Neural, and Computational Principles of Bodily Self-Consciousness. Neuron, 88(1), 145‑166.

Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669), 756‑756.

Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Friston, K. J. (2010). The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy: a neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain, awq010.

Carhart-Harris, R. L., Leech, R., Hellyer, P. J., Shanahan, M., Feilding, A., Tagliazucchi, E., … Nutt, D. (2014). The entropic brain: a theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8.

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.

Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., & Thompson, E. (2011). Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(3), 104‑112.

Dainton, B. (2008). The Phenomenal Self. Oxford University Press.

Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

de Vignemont, F. (forthcoming). Agency and bodily ownership: The Bodyguard hypothesis. In F. De Vignemont & A. Alsmith (Éd.), The subject’s matter (MIT Press).

Dor-Ziderman, Y., Berkovich-Ohana, A., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2013). Mindfulness-induced selflessness: a MEG neurophenomenological study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7.

Ehrsson, H. H. (2007). The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences. Science, 317(5841), 1048‑1048.

Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14‑21.

Guillot, M. (2016). I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1‑31.

Hohwy, J., & Michael, J. (forthcoming). Why should any body have a self? In A. Alsmith & F. Vignemont (Éd.), The Body and the Self, Revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Horgan, T., Tienson, J., & George, G. (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In K. Uriah & K. Williford (Éd.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.

Ionta, S., Heydrich, L., Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M., Fornari, E., Chapuis, D., … Blanke, O. (2011). Multisensory Mechanisms in Temporo-Parietal Cortex Support Self-Location and First-Person Perspective. Neuron, 70(2), 363‑374.

Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33(1), 103–132.

Kriegel, U. (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71(1), 23‑57.

Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective consciousness: A self-representational theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review, 116(1), 252‑282.

Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M., & Blanke, O. (2009). Spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 110‑117.

Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., & Blanke, O. (2007). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science, 317(5841), 1096‑1099.

Levine, J. (2001). Purple haze: The puzzle of consciousness (Vol. 6). Oxford University Press Oxford.

Limanowski, J. (2014). What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 946.

Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013). Minimal self-models and the free energy principle. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7.

Metzinger, T. (2013). Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research. Consciousness Research, 4, 746.

Millière, R. (forthcoming). Looking for the self: an interdisciplinary perspective on drug-induced ego dissolution. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.

Moutoussis, M., Fearon, P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2014). Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review. Consciousness and Cognition, 25, 67‑76.

Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435‑450.

Occhionero, M., & Cicogna, P. C. (2011). Autoscopic phenomena and one’s own body representation in dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1009‑1015.

Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(11), 565‑573.

Spence, C., & Driver, J. (Éd.). (2004). Crossmodal Space and Crossmodal Attention (1 edition). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Strawson, G. (2011). Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Oxford University Press Uk.

Tsakiris, M. (2017). The multisensory basis of the self: From body to identity to others. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70(4), 597‑609.

Windt, J. M. (2010). The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 295‑316.

Windt, J. M., Nielsen, T., & Thompson, E. (2016). Does Consciousness Disappear in Dreamless Sleep? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(12), 871‑882.

Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.

Zahavi, D. (2010). Minimal Self and Narrative Self. A Distinction in Need of Refinement. In T. F. and H. S. and P. Heningnsen (Éd.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders (p. 3–11). Heningnsen.

Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. Oxford University Press.

Zahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2016). For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not. In D. O. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, & W. Hopp (Éd.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. London: Routledge.